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I. INTRODUCTION
A generation ago, Professor (now Circuit Judge) Joseph Sneed
identified seven pervasive purposes of the income tax useful in
evaluating proposals to change income tax provisions.1 This paper asks
* Professor of Law and Director, Institute on International and Comparative
Law, University of San Diego. B.A. 1960, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1963,
Harvard University; LL.M. 1964, George Washington University; D.E.S.S. Conseil
Juridique et Fiscal d’Entreprise 1981, Université de Paris I Panthèon-Sorbonne.
1. Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV.
567 (1965), expanded in JOSEPH T. SNEED, THE CONFIGURATIONS OF GROSS INCOME
(1967) [hereinafter CONFIGURATIONS].
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whether those criteria also apply to the international aspects of the
United States income tax, and whether other criteria might also apply.
Sneed’s criteria are:
1. Adequacy. To what extent does the provision raise adequate
income?
2. Practicality. How easily is the provision administered by
both the government and taxpayers? This criterion calls for
provisions with bright lines that respect normal business and
accounting practices, and that are easy and inexpensive to enforce.
3. Equality. To what extent does the provision impose equal
taxes on those with equal incomes?
4. Stability. To what extent does the provision contribute to
economic stability?
5. Reduced economic inequality. To what extent does the
provision reduce economic inequality by disproportionately increasing
tax as wealth increases?
6. Free market compatibility. To what extent does the
provision distort what would happen in the market in its absence?
7. Political order. To what extent does the provision complement
or contradict the Constitution or nontax statutory provisions or
implement the aspirations of a dominant political group?2
International income tax provisions can be divided into five groups.
There are provisions defining the territory, such as those specifying the
geographic source of income,3 or the definition of a resident.4 Group
two provisions are designed for uniquely international events, such as
currency translation5 (and there may be arguments about whether groups
one and two constitute but a single class). A third group of provisions
are ordinary, domestic tax provisions that happen to find their greatest
field of application in the international sphere. An example is allocation
of income.6 The largest number of international tax provisions are
overlays. There is a perfectly good domestic provision that has
problems in the international area, so a new provision is enacted that
relates to those international problems. An example is the area of taxfree incorporations, which under previous law permitted some gains to
2. The close reader has noted that the statement of each criterion has assumed
that no provision will perfectly implement that criterion, nor will any completely destroy
it. In each case, one is comparing the proposed provision to the current one, and it is a
matter of direction (e.g., does this provision increase or reduce economic stability?) and
degree (by how much?).
3. I.R.C. §§ 861–865 (2004).
4. Id. § 7701(b)(1)(A).
5. Id. §§ 964(b), 988.
6. Id. § 482.
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escape tax when the property was transferred to a foreign corporation.7
Finally, there are a series of provisions that use the tax laws to
implement nontax policies, such as international antiboycott legislation.8
Tax criteria do not often influence the enactment of provisions in this
fifth group, but they may be crucial in determining their nature.
Professor Sneed’s criteria are meant to be used on individual
provisions, rather than on an entire subsystem, and are meant to be
analyzed in much more detail than is done below. However, it is
instructive to take an impressionistic look at the extent to which his
criteria seem appropriate to international provisions.
II. THE SNEED CRITERIA AND INTERNATIONAL TAX
A. Adequacy
Adequacy on its face seems to assume that there is a set amount of
income required by the federal government.9 For our purposes, it is
easier to ask whether the provision tends to increase or decrease federal
revenues.
Some international tax provisions decrease revenues. One thinks of
the foreign earned income and housing exclusion, whereby the first
$80,000 of earned income of a U.S. citizen with a bona fide foreign
residence is excluded from gross income10 or the exclusion of certain
U.S. bank interest from the taxable income of nonresident aliens.11
Tax treaties occupy a strange position. The United States has signed
7. Compare id. § 351 (nonrecognition of gain or loss on transfer of property to a
corporation if exchanged for a controlling share of its stock) with § 367 (taxation of
some gain on transfer of property by a U.S. corporation to an 80% controlled foreign
corporation).
8. Id. § 999 (requiring reports of solicitations to participate in an international
boycott); id. § 908 (reducing the foreign tax credit of persons who cooperate with
international boycotts); id. § 952(a)(4) (characterizing payments of illegal bribes or
kickbacks as Subpart F income).
9. A cynic would suggest that regardless of which party rules, there is no limit on
the spending desires of the federal government. But when Democrats are in charge,
spending is restrained by the state’s ability to collect taxes, while Republican spending is
restrained by the government’s ability to borrow.
10. I.R.C. § 911.
11. Id. § 871(h). One might argue that this is not truly a loss of revenue because if
this bank interest were taxed by the United States, the gross amounts on deposit in U.S.
banks would be severely reduced with the result that the banks would have less taxable
income and would pay much less tax. A careful empirical study might establish the truth
of this proposition, but I find it dubious.
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more than forty tax treaties. Most of them are with our major trading
partners. They reduce or eliminate tax at source on investment income,
grant the first right to tax to the source state on business income and
personal service income but only if that income is earned through a
permanent establishment or a fixed base, and require the home state to
relieve double taxation by granting either a credit or a deduction for
taxes paid in the source state. The practical effect (much simplified) is
that the ability to tax interest and royalties is reserved to the home state;
tax on dividends is split roughly evenly between the source and the
home state; and business income is taxed almost entirely by the source
state. Through the late 1980s, the United States was a net capital
exporting state; since about 1990, it has been a net capital importer,
though it remains a net exporter for foreign direct investment (mostly
stocks and bonds of controlled foreign corporations). The capital export
is about three fourths of the capital import.12 So the net tax effect will
depend on the kinds of income earned by those capital exports.
When the basic provisions of tax treaties became fixed, the United
States was a net capital exporter in all categories. So its revenue
benefited from the way tax treaties exempted interest and royalties from
tax in the source country, and from tax treaties’ limit on source country
taxation to half the tax on dividends. Provisions granting the source
country’s unlimited right to tax income from real estate simply
confirmed the reality that the source country had the power to do so
because it had control of the realty, the income-generating entity. The
provisions on taxing business income and personal services income
carve a slice from the source country’s otherwise limitless tax
jurisdiction: source country tax will be imposed only when the activities
in the source country reach a certain degree of intensity that is called
either a permanent establishment or a fixed base. The practical
obligation imposed on the home state by tax treaties was to mitigate
double taxation by providing either a credit for source country tax or a
deduction for source country income. Most capital exporting states were
already doing this as a matter of domestic law, so although the promise
was very valuable to capital-importing states (because without it the
capital flow would be significantly reduced), these provisions had no net
cost to the capital-exporting states because they were already providing
it. Thus, when the income tax treaties’ provisions became fixed for the
United States, the provisions were revenue-enhancing.
12. Elena L. Nguyen, The International Investment Position of the United States at
Yearend 2001, 82 SURV. CURRENT BUS. 10 (2002); Russell Scholl, The International
Investment Position of the United States: Developments in 1971, 52 SURV. CURRENT
BUS. 18 (1972).
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Tax treaty status today depends on the precise figures, but it is fair to
say that portfolio investment (where the United States is more frequently
the source state today) favors the home state, and foreign direct investment
(where the United States is more frequently the home state) appears to
favor the source state, but in fact favors the home state. Consequently,
as the United States shifts its position from home to source state, treaty
provisions that were once revenue-enhancing become revenue-draining.
Most international tax provisions tend to increase federal revenues.
The basic problem of international tax is that a plethora of national
jurisdictions impose widely varying taxes on different tax bases and at
different rates. Given complete freedom, a rational taxpayer selects the
tax system that produces the lowest effective tax, whether by reducing
the tax base, reducing the rate, or evasion. Most international tax
provisions are designed to cabin that freedom. For instance, a taxpayer
can establish a wholly-owned corporation and transfer assets to it
without paying tax on the gain that has accrued on those assets.13 If
these assets were located outside the United States or were intangible
assets, they could be sold by a foreign taxpayer without realizing gain.
A special international tax provision requires that the incorporator pay
tax on some of these assets at the time of incorporation, thereby
increasing federal revenues.14 Likewise a taxpayer’s attempt to allocate
income to a low-tax jurisdiction or to allocate deductions to the United
States may be foiled by the Commissioner’s use of a provision requiring
an accounting system that clearly reflects the income of each taxpayer.15
B. Practicality
Practicality in domestic tax provisions usually refers to the clarity of
the provision, the precision of the lines it draws, the cost of practical
enforcement, and the extent to which its dictates conform to the way
taxpayers would normally act.16 With international tax, a new aspect of
practicality is introduced. The tax must be collectible. This is because
the United States does not have continued jurisdiction over the taxpayer,
and may not have power over the asset when the tax that would
otherwise be due remains unpaid.
13. I.R.C. § 351.
14. Id. § 367(a).
15. Id. § 482.
16. See CONFIGURATIONS, supra note 1, at 3 (“Practicality obviously refers to the
feasibility of a provision.”).
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It is for this reason that capital gains on stock, bonds, and other
movable assets are not taxed by the United States unless the owner is a
U.S. person.17 This is true even if the stock or debt is issued by a U.S.
corporation. The taxpayer is not subject to U.S. power, and the asset
that formed the connection to the United States no longer belongs to the
taxpayer.
Another example: When a foreign corporation earns income in the
United States, the foreign corporation pays U.S. income tax on that
income in the year in which it is earned.18 To equalize the tax treatment
of the foreign corporation with that of a U.S. corporation, the foreign
corporation should pay a further tax to the United States based on the
extent to which the foreign corporation’s dividends consist of income
earned from U.S. businesses.
Enforcement of the first tax was easy; enforcement of the second tax
was difficult. The foreign corporation was never publicly traded; though
a foreign corporation, it was kept separate from other businesses of the
group to insulate related entities from litigation in the United States. It
was difficult for the IRS to discover when the U.S. operation had paid
dividends so that it could collect the second tax.
Compare the branch profits tax, which substitutes for the dividend tax.
It is triggered when there are earnings that are repatriated from the U.S.
operation. This flow of capital from the United States to a foreign
location is easier to trace than the payment of a dividend abroad because
it uses the banking system, and matching it with a branch interest tax
stymies the attempt to avoid it by making the original capital contribution as
a loan rather than a stock purchase.19
So it is fair to say that practicality is an important criterion of
international tax. Another example of provisions that owe their shape to
this kind of practicality include the limitations on outbound transfers in
corporate organizations and reorganizations.20
This is not to say that the world of international tax is devoid of
complexity. Many of the rules are of a complexity that rivals the field of
deferred compensation. I once heard the Subpart F area referred to as a
simple rule overlain with DEELS—Definitions, Exceptions, Exemptions,
Limitations, and Special rules. But the areas of complexity are usually
matched to taxpayers who can afford good tax counsel, and are normally
accompanied by safe harbor provisions guaranteeing taxpayers good
results if the safe harbor criteria are matched.
17. Technically, this is achieved by classifying the sale of an asset by a
nonresident as income from outside the United States. I.R.C. §§ 865(a)(2), 871(a)(1).
18. Id. § 881.
19. Id. § 884.
20. Id. § 367.
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The largest area of significant unpredictability lies in income allocation
involving intangibles. The rules channel the taxpayer toward a costly
advanced pricing agreement, as there is no other way to reasonably
predict the tax liability, and the penalties for a mistaken guess can be
fearsome.21
C. Equality
Equality poses significant problems in all its applications. Equality
assumes that there is a model to which the subject demanding equality
should conform. But no two taxpayers are ever identical, so the question
posed by equality is whether they are sufficiently similar to require equal
treatment. To give a simple example, a person who believes that the
important thing about income is its spendability is likely to believe that
an individual with $10,000 in income from wages should be taxed
exactly the same as a person who receives the same income, but all of it
derived from the sale of stock. There are two ways in which the taxation
may vary, the base and the rate. Thus, a person who believes that wage
income should be taxed less aggressively than capital gains income
might argue that there are expenses of earning wage income, such as
commuting, clothes suitable for business, lunches that must be eaten in
restaurants, etc., that are not deductible and that do not figure in the cost
of earning capital gains. That person might propose that: (1) these
expenses be deductible; or (2) a deduction computed as a percentage of
salary should be available in lieu of actual expenses, as France makes
available to its employees;22 or (3) the rate of tax imposed on wages
should be lower. By the same token, proponents of capital gains income
will have reasons why it should be accorded more preferential tax than
wage income.
The argument in international tax circles is similar. One group argues
that all U.S. citizens and residents should be taxed equally on the same
income, regardless of its source. This is called capital-export neutrality
(CEN). It requires that the tax abroad always be the same or less than
the home-state tax, and requires the home state to completely relieve
double taxation. Another group argues that the crucial question is
21. See Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 375 (describing the requirements for an
Advance Pricing Agreement); I.R.C. § 6662 (substantially increasing the penalties for
mistakes in §482 allocations).
22. France, Code Général des Impôts art. 83-3.
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whether everyone carrying on activities in the same place is treated
equally. For this group, everyone doing business in the United States
should suffer the same level of taxation, regardless of their state of
residency or citizenship. This is called capital-import neutrality (CIN),
and requires that tax be imposed only at source. This is sometimes
called a tax based on territoriality, but this is deceptive, as its message is
that the home state must refrain from taxing. We will meet both CEN
and CIN again in their most prevalent use, free market compatibility.
Here, however, the question is equality, where the standard discourse
relates to fairness, not to economic efficiency. The comparisons to be
made in the international field are two: between income earned
domestically and income earned abroad, and between income earned in
the United States by home-state taxpayers (citizens, residents, U.S.
corporations), and by foreign taxpayers.
There are some significant differences in the taxation of income
earned abroad by U.S. taxpayers from that of income earned in the
United States. The exemption of the first $80,000 of earned income
from abroad is one.23 The fact that income earned abroad through a
closed corporation is not taxed by the United States until it is repatriated
is another.24 However, it should be noted that since the 1960s, some
income earned abroad by controlled foreign corporations is subject to
current tax.25 Much of this discussion is carried on in economic terms,
but much is also couched in terms of equity.
Turning to foreign taxpayers, the basic rule for foreign taxpayers who
receive business income from the United States is the same as for U.S.
taxpayers, except for the branch profits tax. Foreign taxpayers receiving
investment income are subject to substantially different tax treatment.26
While domestic taxpayers are taxed on their net investment income at
ordinary graduated rates, foreign taxpayers are taxed on their gross
income at a flat 30% rate.27 The 30% rate has remained unchanged
through successive rounds of tax cuts, so whatever its relationship might
have been to the rates in force when enacted, that relationship has
changed significantly over the years.
In taxing foreign investment income differently, the justification has
been practicality. Because the taxpayer is not subject to U.S. taxing
23. I.R.C. § 911.
24. Id. §§ 881–882.
25. Id. §§ 951–964.
26. While it can be argued that foreigners are also subject to special rules on the
disposition of real estate that are not applicable to U.S. taxpayers, I do not believe that is
true. The Foreign Investors Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) serves to collect tax on the
sale of U.S. realty when a U.S. person would pay it. Id. § 897.
27. Id. §§ 871(a), 881(a).
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jurisdiction as the home state, these different rules are justified as ways
to ensure that the tax is collected. There is no requirement in tax law, as
there is in certain constitutional law cases, that the least restrictive means
be chosen.
D. Stability
Stability is a strange criterion. It refers to the tendency of a tax
provision to correct an economy out of equilibrium. If the economy is
overheating, a provision that conforms to stability will restrain it. If the
economy is insufficiently developed, a provision that conforms to
stability will result in increased investment.28 It assumes the correctness
of the Keynesian multiplier-accelerator interaction, and that government
investment has less a stimulating effect on the economy than does
private investment.
The classic illustration of a provision that provides stability is the
progressive rate structure. As incomes grow (inflation), it takes more
and more money from the private sector and, as incomes shrink, the tax
take shrinks more than proportionally.
It does not appear that this criterion has much bite in international tax.
No provisions come to mind that are characterized by their anticyclical
effects. Indeed, to the extent that the international sphere is dominated
by corporations, where tax rates are only progressive at very low levels,
stabilizing provisions are not frequently encountered.
E. Reduced Economic Inequality
Reduced economic inequality is another criterion that is not frequently
discussed in international tax circles. In domestic tax circles, it tends to
appear with provisions that grant benefits to recipients who turn out to
be mostly low income taxpayers. An example is the exclusion for meals
and lodging provided in kind on the employer’s premises,29 the largest
number of whose beneficiaries are maids and restaurant workers. A
second class of economic inequality reducers are provisions that grant
benefits that disappear as income increases, such as the dependent care
credit, earned income credit, personal exemption, or itemized deductions.30
28. Politicians seldom find the economy overheated, and frequently declare it
underdeveloped. Constituents with jobs are thought unlikely to vote out the incumbent.
29. I.R.C. § 119.
30. Id. § 21 (dependent care credit); id. § 31 (earned income credit); id. § 68
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On this matter, it is hard to think of a single provision that is exclusively
international that satisfies this criterion. Indeed, if anything international
can be said on this topic, it is that the failure to tax investment income of
foreign residents at progressive rates, and the failure to consider their
other (non-U.S. source income) in setting those rates, contravenes reduced
economic inequality. But given the sharp decline in progressivity in U.S.
tax rates since 1954, this criterion has appeared less important than it
was when professor Sneed wrote.31
Nor is it clear that the United States cares much about the distribution
of assets outside the United States. It can therefore be argued that
whatever the position of reduced economic inequality for considering
the taxation of American citizens or residents, it has no place in the
taxation of foreigners.
F. Free Market Compatibility
Free market compatibility asks that taxes be designed so that they
distort as little as possible the investment and spending decisions that
would otherwise be made. Put another way, this is a criterion of
economic efficiency. The assumption is that persons make investment
and spending decisions based on the best economic return after taxes.
The economy benefits when those decisions are made based on greatest
expected return. Likewise, the greatest satisfaction of societal wants
occurs in a situation of perfect competition because prices are competed
down to where they only slightly exceed cost. This makes the greatest
number of goods and services available at a minimal cost. If this
economic situation can be achieved or approached, the function of the
tax system is to not destroy it. Decisions should still be made based on
economic return, not based on tax considerations.
Any tax will disturb pure economic calculations, but some will disturb
(itemized deductions); id. § 151(d) (personal exemptions).
31. An examination of the Internal Revenue Codes in effect in the listed years
reveals that the following were the maximum marginal income tax rates for the indicated
years:
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them more than others. For example, a tax imposed at the same rate will
disturb economic decisions less than a tax that has different rates for
substitutable products. A tax imposed on a large set of similar transactions
(like the income tax) is preferable to a tax imposed on a smaller set of
transactions (such as an oil extraction tax). A tax imposed at a uniform
rate on all investment opportunities would alter investor decisions less
than a tax that exempted interest from bonds of state or local
governments, or that taxed long term capital gains at a lower rate than
periodic income from the same investment. If the tax is to be less
general, it is better to impose it on transactions for which there are no
readily available substitutes. This goes not to the equity of the tax. The
tax may be quite inequitable, but still meet the criterion of free market
compatibility because the taxpayer has difficulty avoiding it by
substituting a comparable nontaxable transaction.
It is in the criterion of free market compatibility that the battle
between capital-export neutrality (CEN) and capital-import neutrality
(CIN) reaches its climax.
CEN starts with the proposition that most international tax questions
revolve around investment. It postulates that the key decision maker is
the investor. The tax system should not distort the investor’s decisions.
The investor has a choice among many investments, including some that
are domestic and some that are located abroad. A tax system that does
not distinguish between those investments is CEN because the investor
will not consider taxes in deciding whether to invest at home or abroad.
The largest violation of CEN in the U.S. tax system is according
deferral to income earned through a foreign corporation. That income is
not taxed until repatriated. All other things being equal, that deferral
gives the investor in foreign assets through a foreign corporation a big
advantage over the investor in a domestic corporation, which would pay
U.S. tax annually on its income. With a foreign corporation, the income
can be accumulated and reinvested abroad without being diminished by
U.S. taxes.32 While the above assumes that income taxes imposed by
foreign countries do not offset the deferred U.S. income tax, that is
frequent enough with investment income to be realistic.
Consequently, a great step toward free market compatibility was taken
32. Other benefits of deferral, such as likely monetary inflation making the cost of
taxes paid later worth less in real terms, the likelihood that rates will change to the
advantage of the taxpayer, and the possibility of using the tax saved to leverage an even
greater investment, need not be discussed here.
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with the partial enactment of the Kennedy proposals as Subpart F,33
which ended deferral for many kinds of passive and related-party income
earned abroad. While this did not eliminate the difference between
working through domestic and foreign corporations, it reduced that
difference.
The CEN principle of neutrality also applies to labor-export neutrality.
A person, in deciding whether to work at home or abroad, should not be
influenced by tax considerations. The earned income exclusion that
permits the exclusion from U.S. gross income of the first $80,000 of
earned income from abroad, is the principal offender.34
Partisans of CIN take a different view. For them, the important thing
is to create a perfectly competitive experience. For them, source is all.
Persons from many countries will do business in country X. The
important competitive equality requires that all persons doing business
in country X be subject to the same taxes; otherwise, one will be at a
competitive advantage. The inevitable implication of CIN is that only
the source country can tax that enterprise. Or, another possibility is that
the tax on the enterprise cannot exceed the tax imposed by the source
country which could, by tax treaty, cede some of its normal taxing
jurisdiction to the host country. In that case, there must also be a limit
on the tax jurisdiction of the host country so that the total tax imposed
would not exceed the tax imposed by the source country on competing
enterprises, such as domestic enterprises, and enterprises of other
countries with whom the source country does not have a tax treaty, that
do not benefit from tax treaties.
Both deferral for investments through foreign corporations and the
earned income exclusion go in the direction of implementing CIN, but
not entirely. While there are many European countries that exempt the
foreign business income of their enterprises, which is a CIN move, they
almost universally count that exempted income in determining the
progressive rates to be applied, which is decidedly non-CIN.35
G. Political Order
It is not clear that political order has much purchase in the realm of
international tax. There do not seem to be great constitutional principles
at stake, though the role of federalism seems to be quite strong in the
United States’ refusal to limit by treaty the taxing power of any of its
33. I.R.C. §§ 951–964.
34. Id. § 911.
35. For a helpful discussion, see generally Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX
L. REV. 261 (2001).
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states other than by a nondiscrimination clause.
Likewise, it does not appear that the political parties have sharply
differentiated views on international tax questions. While Republican
rhetoric has perhaps been more business friendly, there have been no
shortage of Democratic votes for export subsidies, and Republican
administrations seem as determined as their Democratic counterparts to
stamp out international tax evasion.
III. OTHER CRITERIA
A. Job Creation or Preservation
One constantly hears arguments that lead to the creation or preservation
of U.S. jobs.
For instance, a persistent part of U.S. international tax policy has been
a subsidy for exports. The names change with the seasons as the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) declares the provisions in violation of free
trade agreements, but the purpose remains constant: to relieve exporters
of some of their tax burden. Other countries subsidize exports by
relieving them of the value added tax. Lacking a national sales or value
added tax, the U.S. solution has been to provide income tax relief. The
appeal here is to the jobs created by exports.
Other examples are provisions designed to lure foreign capital to the
United States. Exemption from income tax of interest deposited in U.S.
banks36 increases the amount of capital available for loan to U.S.
businesses, which in turn permits the creation of more U.S. jobs. There
has even been talk of removing tax benefits from U.S. corporations who
choose to become foreign corporations.
While these discussions and consequences are real, I prefer to think of
them as part of a larger criterion of Balance-of-Payments Enhancement.
B. Balance-of-Payments Enhancement
The balance of payments is a huge accounting game. If the United
States buys more goods abroad than it sells abroad, it has a trade deficit.
It is a net dollar debtor. Without further activity, the United States will
need to give foreign countries gold in order to redeem the dollars the
United States has used to buy goods.
36.

I.R.C. § 871(h).
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Fortunately, trade is not the only activity that causes money to cross
national boundaries. There is also the supply of services, tourism,
returns on investment such as dividends, interest, and royalties, and
investments themselves.
No country can run a long-term balance of payments deficit. No one
has enough gold to do that. If it appears that there will be a long-term
deficit in its balance of payments, the market will devalue the currency
of the deficit-running country. This will make its imports more expensive,
and also make it more expensive for its residents to invest abroad.
Devaluation makes the country’s exports cheaper, and renders investment in
the country less costly for foreigners in terms of their currency. So in
the long run, the system is self-correcting, and deficits in the balance of
payments will disappear. But in the meantime, there may be significant
dislocations, which the United States wishes to avoid by keeping exports
high and maintaining a high level of incoming investment.
Examples in the tax system are many. In addition to the export subsidies
and exemption of income from U.S. bank accounts just mentioned, there
is no tax on U.S. capital gains,37 and most of our tax treaties eliminate
tax on interest and royalties, and reduce them on dividends flowing
abroad. The most prominent exception is the tax on gains by foreigners
on U.S. real estate,38 thereby reducing its attraction to a foreign investor.
IV. SUMMARY AND ORDERING
We have seen that the criteria of Reduced Economic Inequality, Stability,
and Political Order have little purchase in discussions of international tax
policy. Adequacy, Practicality, Equity, Free Market Compatibility, and
Balance-of-payments Enhancement seem important international criteria.
It would enhance the utility of the concept if one could rank the
importance of these five criteria. While I am unable to assign constant
rankings to the criteria, some observations about them can be assayed.
Practicality in the sense of power is an important negative criterion.
Tax provisions that wish to reach beyond U.S. territorial grasp seldom
see the light of day. On the other hand, the enforcement of subpoenas on
sellers of U.S. tax shelters, and the controversy over whether they must
disclose the identity of their clients (even where the subject matter lies
abroad) indicate that actual practicality may be broader than cynics
believe.39
37. Id. §§ 865(a)(2), 871(a)(1).
38. Id. § 897.
39. See, e.g., United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, Roes v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1410 (2004); United States v. Arthur Andersen,
L.L.P., 2003-2 T.C. ¶ 50,624 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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Practicality in the sense of ease of application is not a very important
international criterion. Most taxpayers with international tax problems
are sophisticated, wealthy and well-represented. In the absence of
enhanced sanctions, they would sacrifice predictability for a chance at
the slightest benefit.
Free Market Compatibility and Balance-of-payments Enhancement are
two other criteria much in play. There are few international provisions that
do not invoke both of these considerations.
Adequacy should be a criterion much in play, as extracting taxes from
people who cannot vote (aliens) or people who do not regularly vote
(nonresident citizens) is a basic tenet of politics.40 Yet one seldom sees
international provisions as major revenue enhancers or revenue losers.
Equity is an argument frequently made, though it does not appear to
have significant weight outside the area of Free Market Compatibility.

40. The universality of transient occupancy taxes on hotel rooms is good evidence
of that. The finance minister to Louis XIV, Jean Baptiste Colbert, put it this way: “The
art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest amount of
feathers with the smallest amount of squealing.”
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